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INTERESTS IN LAND SUBJECT TO DOWER - IN KENTUCKY

At common law, a widow s dower interest was the right to a life estate, after
the death of her husband, in one-third of the realty of which the husband was
seised in fee simple or fee tail at any time during the marriage, except that there
was no right to dower in land in which she had relinquished such nght 1
In Kentucky, dower is now governed generally by statute, the principal dower
statutes, in regard to real property, being declaratory of the common law to a
great degree. The wife s dower interest is still a life estate in one-third of the
realty of which the husband was seised in fee simple during coverture, unless she
has in some manner relinquished that right. Therefore, there are two basic requirements for dower: that the husband be seised during coverture, and that he
have a fee simple estate.
The words "seized" and "seisin" are not susceptible of precise definition.
Most authorities agree that at common law "seisi" usually meant the land of
possession one had when he had a freehold ownership 3 However, in more recent
times, the ownership connotation has been emphasized, and the word "seized"
has frequently been used as if it were synonomous with "owned."' In determinIng whether there is a dower interest, "seized" seems to have been interpreted by
the courts to mean a present beneficial ownership. As can be seen as this note
develops, the meamng given to this key word has actually been the determinmg
factor as to which interests earned with them, a right to dower. In this connection, it should be recognized that actual possession by the husband is not necessary as long as he had the requisite seisin.'
If the fee simple ownership of the husband during coverture has not been
modified in any of many possible ways, some of which are subsequently discussed,
PRoPERTY, see. 487 (3rd ed. 1939).
'Ky. RE;. STAT. sec. 392.020 (1948)- "After the death of either the husband
or wife, the survivor shall have an estate for his or her life mnone-third of all the
real estate of which the other spouse or anyone for the use of the other spouse,
was seized of an estate in fee simple during coverture, unless the survivor s right
to such dower or interest has been barred, forfeited or relinquished
" A statute substantially to this effect was enacted at least as early as 1809. 1 STAT. LAw
OF KY. p. 516 (Littell, 1809).
KY. REv. STAT. sec. 392.030 (1948)' "If the husband, during the coverture,
was seized in law of the fee simple of any real estate, then the wife, if she survives
him, may have dower in that real estate, although the husband never had actual
12 TIFFANY, REAL

possession."

Ky. Rtv. STAT. sec. 392.040 (1948)" "(1) The wife shall not have dower
in land sold but not conveyed by the husband before marriage, nor in land sold
in good faith after inirrage to satisfy an encumbrance created before marriage
or created by deed in which she joined, or to satisfy a lien for the purchase
money. If, however, there is a surplus of the land or proceeds of sale after
satisfying the lien, she may have dower out of that surplus of the land or compensation out of the surplus of the proceeds, unless they were received or disposed of by the husband in his lifetime. (2) If the husband held land by executory contract only, the wife shall not have dower in the land, unless he owned
such an equitable right at the time of his death." A statute almost exactly like
this one was encated at least as early as 1852. lEv. STAT. OF Ky. c. 47, art. 4,
sees. 6, 13, p. 893 (1852). The present statutes were enacted in 1894.
31 TIFFANY, op. cit. supra, note 1, sec. 20. A freehold interest is one greater
than a leasehold interest. 1 TIFFANY, op. cit. supra, note 1, sec. 25.
'2 TIFFANY, op. cit. supra, note 1, sec. 489.
'KY. REv. STAT. sec. 392.030, supra note 2.

NOTEs Arm COMMENTs
the wife has a dower right in the land. Tis almost meaningless generality is
about the only generality that can be drawn in respect to those interests in land
in which a wife has a right to dower, so, in the interest of accuracy, we are forced
to a consideration of the widow s dower right in certain specific situations. The
writer has not attempted to solve every problem that arises, or even to discuss
them all, but rather, to survey the Kentucky dower law in this respect, and bring
out the general rules governing it.
1.

Life Estates

Clearly, there is no dower right where the husband had only a life estate.'
The statute expressly limits dower to fee simple estates.' Dower is but a continuance of the estate of the husband, and there can be no dower unless it is an-estate
of inheritance.'
2. Future Interests
Where the husband had only a remainder interest and predeceased the
owner of the life estate, the widow has no right to dower in such land." The
courts, in this situation, look to the possessory connotation of "selsin" and since
the husband never owned a freehold interest under which he had possession or a
0
This rule applies even though
right to present possession, he was never "seized."
the owner of the life estate is a widow who has had the land assigned to her as
dower.u However, if the land was subject to a dower right, but the dower was
never assigned, the wife of the owner of the fee has a right to dower in that land."
S. Defeasible Fees
A wife has a right to dower in a defeasible fee owned by the husband,But where the
unless the estate has been determined during the husband's life.'
fee is to be determined if the husband dies without issue, and he does die without
IFord v. Yost, 300 Ky. 764, 190 S.W 2d 21 (1945); Bodkin v. Wright, 266
Ky. 798, 100 S.W 2d 824 (1937); Brady v. Brady, 158 Ky. 541, 165 S.W 655
(1914); Thompson v. Vance, 58 Ky. (1 Metc.) 669 (185&). 2 TIFFANY, op. cit.
supra, note 1, sec. 496.
'KY. REv. STAT. see. 392.020, supra note 2.
'Ford v. Yost, 300 Ky. 764, 190 S.W 2d 21 (1945); Bodkin v. Wright, 266
Ky. 798, 100 S.W 2d 824 (1937).
9
Goodrum s Guardian v. Kelsey, 244 Ky. 349, 50 S.W 2d 932 (1932); Young
v. Morehead, 94 Ky. 608, 23 S.W 511 (1893); Arnold's Heirs v. Arnold's Adinr.,
47 Ky. (8 B. Mon.) 202 (1848). 2 TiFFANY, op. cit. supra, note 1, sec. 501.
iO Dixon v. Harris, 82 Ky. L. Rep. 275, 105 S.W 451 (1907); Butler v. Cheatham, 71 Ky. (8 Bush) 594 (1871); Northcut v. Wipp, 51 Ky. (12 B. Mon.)

65 (1851).
' Carr v. Hart, 232 Ky. 37, 22 S.W 2d 432 (1929); Carter v. McDamel, 94
Ky. 564, 23 S.W 507 (1893); cf. Cate v. Ganter, 31 Ky. L. Rep. 892, 104 S.W
296 (1897) (widow occupied the land as a homestead). 2 TiF1i-Y, op. cit. supra,
note 1, sec. 502.
' Robmson v. Miller, 41 Ky. (2 B. Mon.) 284 (1842). This case may be
sustained on either of two grounds, one of them being the one for which it is
cited. 2 TFFAY, op. cit. supra, note 1, sec. 502.
" Daniel v. McManama, 64 Ky. (1 Bush) 544 (1866).
"Se,-eNorthcut v. Wipp, 51 Ky. (12 B. Mon.) 65, 72 (1851). 1 WALSH,
REAL PropEawY see. 100 (1947).

KENTUCKY LAW JouiRNA
issue, the wife still has a right to dower.' This view is a continuation of the common law view which was earlier taken in regard to fee tails and later extended to
include this situation."
4. Land Jointly Owned
If the land was owned by the husband as a tenant in common, a widow is
entitled to dower in the husband's interest." If the land was partitioned during
the husband's lifetime, the widow has a right to dower only in the part received
by the husband, 8 but if the land was not partitioned during the life of husband,
it has been held that she must take her dower as a tenant in common and is not
entitled to be assigned dower in any certain part of the land 9
5. PartnershipLand
There is a right to dower in the husband's share of partnership realty which
is owned by the partnership at his death, after all the debts of the partnership
have been paid.' An explanation given for this is that each partner holds an
interest in the realty as a tenant in common, in trust for the partnership, and to
the extent that it is needed to satisfy the obligations of the firm, each partner is a
trustee and not a beneficial owner.' It was earlier held that partnership realty
would be treated as personalty for all purposes," but the later view is that once
the partnerstup debts are paid, such realty will go to the widow and heirs as
realty,' at least unless the partners have agreed that it is to be treated as personalty for all purposes.' Of course, if title has once vested in the husband during
"Murphy v. Murphy, 182 Ky. 731, 207 S.W 491 (1919); Landers v. Landers,
151 Ky. 206, 151 S.W 386 (1912); Rice v. Rice, 183 Ky. 406, 118 S.W 270
(1909); Fry v. Scott, 10 Ky. L. Rep. 1013, 11 S.W 426 (1889); Northcutt v.
Wipp, supra note 14. This view, which is apparently the majority view, is severely condemned by 1 WALSH, op. cit. supra, note 14, sec. 100, and he credits
its perpetuation to stare decisis (In this connection see Rice v. Rice, supra at 410,
118 S.W at 271). 2 TIFFANY, op. cit. supra, note 1, see. 510, apparently prefers
the majority view.
"Northcut v. Whipp, 51 Ky.. (12 B. Mon.) 65 (1851)"Bloom v. Sawyer, 121 Ky. 808, 28 Ky. L. Rep. 349, 89 S.W 204 (1905);
Dehoney v. Bell, 17 Ky. L. Rep. 76, 80 S.W 400 (1895); see Davis v. Logan,
39 Ky. (9 Dana) 185, 186 (1839).
'Napper
v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 107 Ky. 134, 53 S.W 28 (1899).
i9Bloom
v. Sawyer, 121 Ky. 308, 28 Ky. L. Rep. 349, 89 S.W 204 (1905).
2 TIFFANY, Op. cit. supra, note 1, sec. 536.
'Lowe v. Lowe, 76 Ky. (13 Bush) 688 (1878); Galbraith v. Gedge, 55 Ky.
(16 B. .Mon.) 631 (1855). The Uniform Partnersip.Act, sec. 25 (e) abolishes
tbe.right to dower in specific partnership property.
' 1 W LsH, op. cit. supra, note 14, sec. 99.
"Cornwall v. Cornwall, 69 Ky. (6 Bush) 369 (1869). This represents the
English and mnority view. 2 TIFFANY, op. cit. supra, note 1, see. 504.
" See Bennett v. Bennett, 137 Ky. 17, 20, 121 S.W 495, 496 (1910); Davidson v. Richmond, 24 Ky. L. Rep. 699, 69 S.W 794 (1902).
'See Givens v. Clark, 13 Ky. Op. 676, 678, 7 Ky. L. Rep. 291 (abstract)
(1885); Lowe v. Lowe, 76 Ky. (13 Bush) 688, 692 (1878). There is an extensive
analysis of the Kentucky law on this point in 25 A.L.R. 397, where it is apparently
concluded that the partners may, by agreement, impress the property With the
character of personalty for all purposes. The cases cited in the previous ootnotg
however, have shown a tendency to discard this, and a recent case, Strode v.
Kramer, 293 Ky. 354, 169 S.W 2d 29 (1943) appears to follow these later cases.
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the marriage, he cannot defeat dower by subsequently turning it into partnership
property.'
6. Land Subject to Equities and Liens
Since the wife s claim through the husband is subject to all the infirmities
of the husband's title, if the husband buys land subject to an outstandig equity
of wuch he has notice, the dower right has no priority over such equity.'
Similarly, the wife does not have a right to dower in land sold to satisfy a
lien for the purchase money,-and as long as-there is such a lien on the land, her
dower right is subject to it.'
She does, however, have dower in any surplus
proceeds from the sale of the land to satisfy such a lien if such proceeds were
notreceived or disposed of by the husband in his lifetime.2 This is now based on
statute, but is consistant with the requirement of beneficial ownership, since the
husband never beneficially owned the land to the extent that he had not paid the
veiior for it.' This supports the observation made earlier that beneficial ownership seems to be the key to the scope of the dower statute. If the vendor waives
the lien as against the vendee, the dower right is no longer subject to it.' It is
not necessary that the lien be enforced by court proceedings; any good faith sale
to satisfy it is sufficient to cut off the dower right."' The husband may sell more
of the land upon which there is such a lien than is necessary to satisfy it, and if
he does so in good faith because of the lien, the wife is still entitled to dower
only in the surplus proceeds.'
If the wife fails to receive her dower out of the
surplus proceeds, she has no claim against the land or the purchaser of the land,
but may look only to the distributees of the surplus.3

See Ratcliffe v. Mason, 92 Ky. 190, 195, 17 S.W 438, 439 (1891).
SAdams v. Collier, 8 Ky. Op. 328 (1875); see Bartlett v. Gouge, 44 Ky.
(5 B. Mon.) 152, 153 (1844).
'KY. BEv. STAT. sec. 392.040, suprq~note 2. Chalk v. Chalk, 291 Ky. 702,
165 S.W 2d 534 (1942); Matney v. Williams, 28 Ky. L. Rep. 494, 89 S.W 678
(1905); Helm v. Board, 114 Ky. 289, 70 S.W 679 (1902); Ratcliffe v. Mason,
92 Ky. 190, 17 S.W 438 (1891); Johnson v. Cantrill, 92 Ky. 59, 17 S.W 206
(1891); Poor y,.Leavell, 12 Ky. Op. 545, 5 Ky. L. Rep. 769 (abstract). (1884);
Lee v. James, 81 Ky. 443, 5 Ky. L. Rep. 492 (1883); Nazereth Literary and.
Benevolent Institution v. Lowe, 40 Ky. (1 B. Mon.) 257 (1841). On this general subject see 52 L.R.A. (N.S.) 555.
'KY. Rv. STAT. sec. 392.040, supra note 2. See Chalk v. Chalk, supra note
27 at 709, 165 S.W 2d at 538; Ratcliffe v. Mason, supra note 27 at 197, 17 S.W
at 439; Nazereth L. &B: I. v.. Lowe, supra note 27 at 259.
"The .wife s right of dower, is subordinate to the vendor s lien for the purchase money, because the lien is coeval with the husband's right to the land, and
he acquires his title subject to the lien. As the title and the lien originate at the
same time, the husband never has any right either equitable or legal unincumbered
by the lien, and the wife s right of dower is therefore subject to the incumbrance."
McClure v. Hams, 51 Ky. (12 B. Mon.) 261, 264 (1851); see Lee v. James, 81
Ky. 443, 445, 5 Ky. L. Rep. 492, 493 (1883).
See .Carpenter s Exr. v. Kearns, 12 Ky. Op. 9, 10, 4 Ky. L. Rep. 825
(abstract) (1883).
3
Ratcliffe v. Mason, 92 Ky. 190, 17 S.W 438 (1891); Johnson v. Cantrill,
92 Ky. 59, 17 S.W 206 (1891); Lee v. James, 81 Ky. 443, 5 Ky. L. Rep. 492

(1883).
' Ratcliffe v. Mason, supra note 31, Melone v. Armstrong, 79 Ky. 248 (1881).
nHelm v. Board, 114 Ky. 289, 70 S.W 679 (1902); Ratcliffe v. Mason, 92
Ky. 190, 17 S.W 438 (1891); Tisdale v. Risk, 70 Ky. (7 Bush) 139 (1870).
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It has also been held that mechanics and materialmen s liens on buildings
erected on the premises are superior to the dower right."
A lien for taxes is superior to a widow s right to dower,:. but if the-land is
sold to satisfy it, she still has a dower right in the remaining land or surplus
proceeds.
The right to dower is not generally subject to other debts of the husband,.and
it cannot be sold in bankruptcy proceedings by the husband without the wife s
consent.'
7

Land Subject to a Mortgage

The wife of a mortgagee in whom title was never vested has no right to dower
in the mortgaged property." This is probably the umversal view in both lien
and title theory states."
Where the husband was the mortgagor of the land, the dower right is subject
to the mortgage if the land was mortgaged before the mamage or if the wife
joined in the mortgage.4 ' However, in both of these cases, the wife has a right
to dower in the surplus proceeds of a sale to satisfy the mortgage, if such proceeds
were not received or disposed of by the husband in his lifetime.42 It has been said
that the only difference between a wife s rights in land encumbered by a mortgage in which she joined and in land subject to a purchase money lien is that in
the former case her rights are limited by her own waiver while in the latter, it is
by operation of law.4" A wife has a dower right in the equity of redemption in
the sense that she has a right to dower in the surplus proceeds from a sale of the
land" or from a sale by the husband of the equity of redemption, 5 and in the
sense that, after a foreclosure sale, she may redeem the land, if the husband is
dead, in the situation where the husband had a right to redeem it, which is, by
statute, where the land was sold for less than two-thirds of its appraised value."
" Nazereth L. & B. I. v. Lowe, 40 Ky. (1 B. Mon.) 257 (1841). The present statute on such liens is Ky. Rv. STAT. sec. 376.010 (1948). This statute is
not clear as to whether such liens are superior to dower. However, the statute of
1831, under which the cited case was decided was even less susceptible of such
an interpretation. 28 C. J. S. 105 says that the weight of authority is contrary
to the view of this case.
'Ky. REv. STAT. sec. 134.420 (1948). Chalk v. Chalk, 291 Ky. 702, 165
S.W 2d 534 (1942); Maryland Casualty Co. v. Lewis, 276 Ky. 263, 124 S.W 2d
(1939); Harrison v. Griffith, 67 Ky. (4 Bush) 146 (1868).
1 Mulligan v. Mulligan, 161 Ky. 628, 171 S.W 420 (1914); Ketterer v. Nelson, 146 Ky. 7, 141 S.W 409 (1911) (curtesy); Harrison v. Griffith, supra note 35.
"See Nelson v. Dunn, 215 Ky. 292, 293, 284 S.W 1084, 1085 (1926).
SRoss v. McGrath s Admr., 27 Ky. L. Rep, 723, 86 S.W 555 (1905).
1 WALSH, Op. cit. supra, note 14, see. 96.
"Ky. REv. STAT. see. 392.040 (1), supra note 2.
41 Ibid. The word "deed" in the statute includes a mortgage.
Schweitzer v.
Wagner, 94 Ky. 458, 22 S.W 883 (1893).
' Nelson v. Dunn, 215 Ky. 292, 284 S.W 1084 (1926); McClain v. McClain,
151 Ky. 356, 151 S.W 926 (1912); Ketterer v. Nelson, 146 Ky. 7, 141 S.W 409
(1911) (curtesy); see Morgan v. Wickliffe, 115 Ky. 226, 235, 72 S.W 1122, 1123
(1903).
'Morgan v. Wickliffe, supra note 42 at 234, 72 S.W at 1123.
" Harrow v. Johnson, 60 Ky. (3 Mete.) 578 (1861).
" See Id. at 581.
" Hiller v. Nelson, 118 S.W 292 (Ky. 1909). Ky. REv. STAT. sec. 426.540
(1948).
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If the widow redeems the land in this last situation, the heirs must contribute
their pro rata share before they are entitled to participate in or enjoy the benefits
of the redemption. 7 It has also been held that if there was mortgaged personalty
as well as realty to secure an obligation, the wife has a right to have the proceeds
from the sale of the personalty applied to the mortgage debt first. 8
When the land is sold to satisfy a mortgage to which the dower right is subject, just as in the case of a purchase money lien, if the wife fails to receive her
dower out of the surplus proceeds, she has no claim against the land or the purchaser of the land.' 9
Of course, if the wife does not join in a mortgage which was executed after
the marriage, then she still has a dower right superior to the mortgage.'
Where the widow is entitled to dower in surplus proceeds, such proceeds are
treated as realty;i so she gets a life estate in one-third.' Assignment of dower in
this situation is actually accomplished by alloting to her absolutely the money
value of her interest, to be ascertained by estimating the probable duration of her
life according to the life tables,' or by giving her the use for life of one-third of
the money.' In McClamn v. McClain, it was held that it is within the discretion
of the court as to which of these methods will be used, such discretion to be
exercised in view of all the facts of the case so as to best protect the interests of
all parties. In that case, the widow sought an absolute allotment of the money
value of her interest. The general rule is that it may be done in either way in
the discretion of the court, except that the widow cannot be forced to take an
absolute sum without her consent.' Since the Kentucky case did not force her
to take an absolute sum, it does not answer the question as to whether or not tis
may be done in Kentucky. However, while there are dicta in the opimon of the
court susceptible of supporting either view, the general tenor of the opimon would
seem to support a view that she may be so forced.
7
lHiller v. Nelson, supra note 46.
'Harrow v. Johnson, 60 Ky. (8 Mete.) 578 (1861). No Kentucky case was
found giving the widow a general right to redeem the property if there has been
no foreclosure. The general rule is that she has such a right. 1 WAL.sH, op. cit.
supra, note 14, sec. 96; 2 TIFFANY, op. cit. supra, note 1, sec. 500. If. the mortgage debt is paid by the personal representative of the husband, generally the
widow is entitled to dower in the land. There is a split of authority as to whether
or not the widow is entitled to have the personalty in the husband's estate applied
to the debt so as to free the land from the mortgage. 2 TIFFANY, op. cit. supra,
note 1, sec. 500. For a more complete discussion of the subject of this footnote,
see 199 C. J. 485.
' See Nelson v. Dunn, 215 Ky. 292, 294, 284 S.W 1084, 1085 ;(1926);'Morgan v.' Wicliffe, 15 Ky. 226, 285, 72 S.W 1122, 1123 (1903).
City Bank & T. Co. v. Planters Bank & T. Co., 176 Ky. 500, 195 S.W 1124.
(1917); McClure v. Hamis, 51 Ky. (12 B. Mon.) 261 (1851).
McClain v. McClain, 151 Ky. 356, 151 S.W 926 (1912).
' McClain v. McClain, supra, note 51, Ketterer v. Nelson, 146 Ky. 7, 141
S.W '409 (1911) (curtesy).
Harrison v. Griffin, 67 Ky. (40 Bush) 146 (1868); see Brewer v. Vanarsdales Heirs, 36 Ky. (6 Dana) 204, 206 (1838).
" McClam v. McClain, 151 Ky. 356, 151 S.W 926 (1912); Harrison v. Griffith, supra note 53.
This is an extension on rehearing of
' 152 Ky. 206, 153 S.W 234 (1913).
McClain v. McClain, supra note 54.
' 1 WALsff, op. cit. supra, note 14, sec. 108.
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8. Instantaneous Setsin
Closely related to the mortgage situation is the problem of the effect of instantaneous seism; that is, where the husband has title for only an instant, and
then conveys the property to another both conveyances constituting a part of
one transaction. In Kentucky, if the seisin is beneficial, then dower attaches
although it is instantaneous.'
It has been held that if the mortgagee, to whom
a mortgage was executed immediately after conveyance to the husband, did not
have a vendor s lien on the property, then there was beneficial seismn in the husband
even though the mortagee furmshed the purchase money.t
9. Land Conveyed In Fraud Of Dower
A wife is entitled to dower in land conveyed by the husband before marriage
but after an agreement to marry when such conveyance was in fraud of dower,"
provided that she did not learn of the conveyance before the marriage." She is
also entitled to dower in land bought by the husband during marriage but convoyed to another by his direction in fraud of dower.' These situations are exceptions tc-the seisin during coverture requirement.
Whether or not there was such fraud depends upon the circumstances, such
as the amount of the husband's real estate which was conveyed, the amount of
consideration he received, and whether or not it was reasonable as a suitable provision made by the husband for the purpose of furishing pecumary aid to the
grantee in view of their relationship and in view of the size of the estates of both
the husband and the grantee.12 If a sizable portion of the husband's estate is
conveyed, it is prima facie in fraud of dower." The husband may, however, in
good faith, make such provision for his children by a former marriage as is reasonable, and no more in amount than a father in Ins pecumary condition nght naturally be expected to give Ins children by way of advancement.
If the husband
"McClure v. Harris, 51 Ky. (12 B. Mopj 261 (1851); Tevis v. Steele, 20
Ky. (4 T. B. Mon.) 339 (1827). "-_W
's,
6p. c7it.su-pra, note14, se6. 96.
' McClure v. Harris, supra note 57. But see Meilvaine v. Mellvame, 10 Ky.
Op. 181, 182 (1879); Gully-v.'Ray, 57 Ky. (18 B. Mon.) 107, 114 (1857). These
two later cases clearly state a contrary rule by way of dictum, and the rule they
state would seem to be more in -accord with the statute (Ky. BEv. STAT. see.'"
392.040 (1), supra, note 2), which says, "a lien- for the purchase money
(italics, writers). The weight of authority is probably in accord with the dicta
of these two cases. 2 TIFFANY, Op. cit. supra, note.1, sec. 490; 52 L.R.A. (N.S.)
543.
'Anderson v. Anderson, 194 Ky. 763; 240 S.W 1061 (1922); Goff v. Goffs
Exr., 175 Ky. 75, 193 S.W 1009 (1917); Leach v. Duvall, 71 Ky. (8 Bush) 201
(1871); Petty v. Petty, 43 Ky. (4 B. Mon.) 215 (1843). 2 TiFFANY, op. cit. supra,
note 1, sec. 506.
" Smith v. Erwin, 26 Ky. L. Rep. 760, 82 S.W 411 (1904); Murray v. Murray, 90'Ky. 1, 13 S.W 244 (1890); Cheshire v. Payne, 55 Ky. (16 B. Mon.) 618
(1855).
"Rowe v. Ratliff, 268 Ky. 217, 104 S.W 2d 437 (1937); Redmond's Admx.
v. Redmond, 112 Ky. 760, 66 S.W 745 (1902).
'Anderson v. Anderson, 194 Ky. 763, 240 S.W 1061 (1922).
Leach v. Duvall, 71 Ky. (8 Bush) 201 (1871); see Fennessey v. Fennessey,
84 Ky. 519, 522, 2 S.W 158, 160 (1886).
"Goff v. Goffs Exr., 175 Ky. 75, 193 S.W 1009 (1917); Fennessey v.
Fennessey, supra note 63. In Anderson v. Anderson, 194 Ky. 763, 767, 240 S.W
1061, 1063 (1922), the court expressly reserved the question as to whether this
exception also applies to a conveyance made by a son to ins dependent mother
and sister.
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had promised his former wife that he would execute the conveyance, tis is also a
circumstance tending to show his good faith.'
10. Land Held in Trust
The wife of a trustee has no right to dower m land held in trust by the
husband, since he has no beneficial ownership. Again, beneficial ownersip is
the determnng factor; but here the term refers to the fact that the trustee has
only a bare legal title. It is apparent 'that the absence of beneficial ownershup in
this situation is something different than the absence of beneficial ownership in
the purchase money lien situation.
Where the land is held in trust for the husband, the wife is entitled to dower,
since he has the beneficial ownership.'
11. Land Under Contract Of Sale
(A) HusbandAs Vendor
Where the husband, before marriage, has contracted to convey the land, the
wife has no dower interest in such land although it is not conveyed until after the
mamage.'
Tis is true even though the vendee had only an option which he
later exercised.' Tis was earlier based upon the idea that the husband never
owned the beneficial interest during the marriage, and it was generally said that
he held the land in trust for the vendee s benefit;"0 but iis situation is now specifically provided for by statute.' Again, here is a situation where the court, before
the statute, applied the beneficial ownership test. But what is beneficial ownership
under a contract to sell land? It has been said that if the vendee gives up is
right to specific performance or takes damages in lieu of it, then the wife does have
a dower right, since the beneficial interest is then said to reinvest in the husband
as of the date of the contract." Where the husband made a bona fide gift before
the marriage and the donee took possession and improved the land, the wife has
Where the husno right to dower if a conveyance is made after the mamage.
band was not bound to convey because the contract was oral or he was an infant
when it was made, there is no dower right if he does later convey," but if he
does not later convey during is lifetime, the wife is entitled to dower.'
I Gaff v. Goffs Exr., supra note 64; Fennessey v. Fennessey, 84 Ky. 519,
158 (1886).
2 S.W
T
'See Tevis v. Steele, 20 Ky. (4 T. B. Mon.) 339, 341 (1827).
'Pursifull's Admx. v. Pursifull, 299 Ky. 245, 184 S. W 2d 967 (1944);
STAT.
Chalk v. Chalk, 291 Ky. 702, 165 S.W 534 (1942). An see Ky. REv.
"
or anyone for the use of
392.020, supra note 2, which says "
'Fontaine v. Dunlap, 82 Ky. 321 (1884); Deans Heirs v. Mitchell's Heirs,
27 Ky, (4 J. J. Marsh) 451 (1830); Stevens v. Smith, 27 Ky. (4 J. J. Marsh)
64 (1
).
Mineral Development Co. v. Hall, 115 S.W 230 (Ky. 1909).
7OFontame v. Dunlap, 82 Ky. 321 (1884); Deans Heirs v. Mitchells Heirs,
27 Ky. (4 J. J. Marsh) 451 (1830); Stevens v. Smith, 27 Ky. (4 J. J. Marsh)
64 (1830).
" Ky. REv. STAT. sec. 892.040, supra note 2.
"Deans Heirs v. Mitchell's Heirs, 27 Ky. (4 J. J. Marsh) 451 (1830).
SGaines v. Gaines Exr. and Heirs, 48 Ky. (9 B. Mon.) 295 (1848).
74
Oldham v. Sale, 40 Ky. (1 B. Mon.) 76 (1840).
'Eubank v. Eubank, 13 Ky. Op. 673, 7 Ky. L. Rep. 291 (abstract) (1885).
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(B) Husband As Vendee
If the husband held the land under an executory contract of purchase only,
the wife has a right to dower in it only if he held such equitable right at his
death." Therefore, if the husband sold or assigned his equitable right before
getting legal title, the wife has no dower rights in the land,- even though he does
later get legal title.' It has been said, however, that a transfer of his equitable
right by operation of law or by reason of the bankruptcy of the husband is not
such a disposition as will deprive the wife of dower.' If the land is sold to satisfy
a purchase money lien before the husband's death, there is still a right to dower
in the surplus proceeds, although the husband only had an equitable title.' An
earlier case held that a wife had a right of dower when the husband held the
equitable title at his death only if he had fully paid for the land,'I but it is now
probably sufficient if the heirs are entitled to get specific performance either by
having the husband's estate pay whatever remains due, or by paying it themselves.'
12. Mines and Minerals
A widow has a dower right in mines opened by the husband upon his land
before his death, and probably she can work these to exhaustion.' She also has
"'Robinson v. Miller, 40 Ky. (1 B. Mon.) 88 (1840); Graham s Heirs v. Graham, 22 Ky. (6 T. B. Mon.) 561 (1828); Bailey and Wife v. Duncans Reprs., 20
Ky. (4 T. B. Mon.) 256 (1827). This case was based on a statute making a
wife dowable in estates held for the use of or in trust for the husband. The court
felt that it was not only intended to embrace express trusts but also trusts resulting
from executory contracts. This is now provided for in Ky. REv. STAT. see.
892.040 (2), supra note 2.
1
Smallridge v. Hazlett, 112 Ky 841, 66 S.W 1043 (1902) semble; Green
v. Ray, 1 Ky. Op. 96 (1867); Gully v. Ray, 57 Ky. (18 B. Mon.) 107 (1857);
Heed v. Ford, 55 Ky. (16 B. Mon.) 114 (1855); Lawson v. Morton, 36 Ky.
(6 Dana) 471 (1838); Hamilton v. Hughes, 29 Ky. (6 J. J. Marsh) 581 (1831).
In this case, the court refused to apply the trust statute mentioned in note 76
supra, largely because of public policy, because title bonds were, by law, assignable, and if a wife s conveyance of her dower rights would be necessary, then the
stdtute making such bonds assignable would be defeated. In Heed v. Ford, supra,
it was added that since title bonds were not required to be recorded and were
freely transferable, the evils resulting from letting dower attach would outweigh
the advantages. The rule has now been adopted by statute (Ky. REv. STAT. see.
392.040 (2), supra note 2), and represents the view of the weight of authority.
2 TIFFANY, op. cit. supra, note 1, sec. 498. This would seem to be a situation
where the court failed to apply the beneficial ownership test. Contra: Winn v.
Elliott, 3 Ky. (1 Hardin) 490 (1808).
Gully v. Ray, supra note 77; Heed v. Ford, supra note 77.
'See Lane v. Judy, 12 Ky. Op. 379, 381, 5 Ky. L. Rep. 513 (abstract)
(1883).
' Tisdale v. Risk, 70 Ky. (7 Bush) 139 (1870).
'Pugh v. Bell, 18 Ky. (2 T. B. Mon.) 125 (1825).
'See Brewer v. Vanarsdales Heirs, 36 Ky. (6 Dana) 204, 205 (1838); cf.
Harrison v. Griffith, 67 Ky. (4 Bush) 146 (1868). There is a clear split of authority on this. 2 TIFF'NY, op. cit. supra, note 1, see. 498.
'Whittaker v. Lindley, 8 Ky. L. Rep. 690 (abstract), 3 S.W 9 (1887). On
this general subject see 2 TIFFANY, op. cit. supra, note 1, see. 492.
'See Damels v. Charles, 172 Ky. 238, 241, 189 S.W 192, 194 (1916).
But see Ky. River Consolidated Coal Co. v. Frazier, 161 Ky. 374, 378, 170 S.W
986 (1914); Whittaker v. Lindley, 8 Ky. L. Rep. 690 (abstract), 3 S.W 9, 10
(1887).
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a dower interest in royalties from mines opened after the husband's death by persons with whom he had entered into enforcible contracts for that purpose while
living.' These mines are treated as realty.' There is a right to dower in unopened mines," and if the husband owns mineral rights, the wife has a dower
interest in such nghts?3 The dower right in royalties paid is an absolute right to
one-third of such royalties, not just a life estate in one-third, provided the husband
made a mineral lease and not an outright conveyance.'
This is based on the
theory that they are profits or rents arising from the use to which the husband
devoted the land.' However, it has been held that if a mineral lease is made by
the wife and the remainderman, she is only entitled to the use of one-third of
the royalties for life,"' just as she would be if they had sold real estate so held. 2
If dower has been assigned in the land by metes and bounds, the wife is entitled
to dower in royalties from mines located on all the property, not just the property
assigned to her, if the mines were opened or the mineral rights were leased before
the husband's death;' tis also being true before there has been an assignment by
metes and bounds.'
In this particular field, especially, the Kentucky law is by
no means certain, although in recent years, it has seemed to be approaching a
degree of certainty. The writer has not discussed many of the problems which
arise, and in many of those which have been mentioned, there has been a lack of
consistency and definiteness in the Kentucky cases.
18. Other Situations
It was at one time held that shares of railroad stock were realty and a widow
had a dower interest in them,' but it is unlikely that these decisions are still of
any weight, and such stock is probably now regarded as personalty.'
'Cook v. Cooks Admr., 261 Ky. 501, 88 S.W 2d 27 (1935); see Crain v.
West, 191 Ky. 1, 5, 229 S.W 51, 53 (1921); Damels v. Charles, 172 Ky. 238,
242, 189 S.W 192, 194 (1916).
See Cramn v. West, supra note 85, at 5, 229 S.W at 53.
STrimble v. Ky. River Coal Corp, 285 Ky. 301, 31 S.W 2d 367 (1930). This
case expressly rejected dicta in several previous Kentucky cases which said that
there was no dower in unopened mines. Since mineral rights are regarded as
real estate, the court could see no reason why the wife should not have a dower
right in them. It admits that dower in unopened mines may be of no beneficial
value to the widow, since she could not open them without committing waste,
but says that it would be beneficial where the widow and the remainderman join
to lease or sell such rights.
bid.
Cook v. Cooks Admr., 261 Ky. 501, 88 S.W 2d 27 (1935); Williamson v.
Williamson, 228 Ky. 589, 4 S.W 2d 392 (1928).
See Collins v. Lemaster s Admr., 232 Ky. 188, 22 S.W 2d 567 (1929).
Lemaster v. Hudson, 214 Ky. 467, 283 S.W 439 (1926).
See Collins v. Lemaster s Admr., 232 Ky. 188, 190, 22 S.W 2d 567 (1929);
Lemaster v. Hudson, supra note 91, at 469, 283 S.W at 440.
'Cook v. Cooks Admr., 261 Ky. 501, 88 S.W 2d 27 (1935).
"Williamson v. Williamson, 223 Ky. 589, 4 S.W 2d 392 (1928); Cram v.
West, 191 Ky. 1, 229 S.W 51 (1921).
Copeland v. Copeland, 70 Ky. (7 Bush) 349 (1870); Price v. Prices
Heirs, 36 Ky. (6 Dana) 107 (1838).
See Chappell v. Chapell, 124 Ky. 691, 697, 99 S.W 959, 960, 30 Ky. L. Rep.
935, 936 (1907); Spalding v. Panes Admr., 81 Ky. 416, 421, 5 Ky. L. Rep. 391,
394 (1883). 1 Ky. AcTs 1871, c. 1866, p. 87, (passed March 22, 1871). 17 AM,
Jim. 675; 19 C. J. 468.
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If the husband was seised of land during coverture but lost it by adverse
possession, the widow still has a dower right in such lands.'
Where the husband has exchanged land with another, the wife cannot have
dower in both tracts, but must elect.s However, a relinquishment of dower in one
during the life of the husband is not a relinquishment of dower in the other, nor
an election to take dower in the one relinquished.' This must mean that a relinquishment of. dower in one is actually an election to take dower in the other
tract.
JAMES C. BLAIr

SWilliams v. Williams, 89 Ky. 381, 11 Ky. L. Rep. 608, 12 S.W 760 (1889).
In this case, the adverse possession did not begin until after the marriage. If the
land was in the adverse possession of another the whole time during the marriage,
generally, the wife has no dower right because the husband was not seised during
the marriage. 2 TiFFANY, op. cit. supra, note 1, sec. 489.
' Stevenson v. Brasher, 90 Ky. 23, 11 Ky. L. Rep. 799, 13 S.W 242 (1890);
Mahoney v. Young, 33 Ky. (3 Dana) 588 (1835); see Stevens v. Smith, 27 Ky.
(4 J. J. Marsh) 64 (1830). This rule is a common law exception to the rule
that a wife has dower in all lands of which the husband was seised during coverture. The rule only applies "
when the transaction is an exchange m the
srtict common law meamng of the word, involving a mutual grant of equal interests in the respective parcels of land." 2 TiFFANY, op. cit. supra, note 1, see. 494
at p. 352.
' Stevenson v. Brasher, supra note 98; Mahoney v. Young, supra note 98.

